Abstract. Conflicts between multiculturalism and women's rights occur when minority group practices clash with the liberal rights of minority women. Theorists argue that liberal democracies ought to adopt just negotiating practices to resolve these conflicts; empiricists investigate how rights legislation for minority groups and women gets passed. Few scholars examine the origins of these conflicts, how they are reproduced, and their effects on minority women. Drawing on intersectionality theory I argue that multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts are rooted in unitary rights (cultural rights, women's rights; not minority women's rights) and that these rights call up conflicts that entrench minority women's domination. The more that liberal democracies endorse unitary rights the more state elites address multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts and institutionalize them throughout the state. As a result, minority women become the targets of state policy. Because they rarely have influence in liberal democratic politics, this means they become the objects of these conflicts instead of citizens claiming their rights. Hence unitary rights are complicit in perpetuating minority women's domination. Drawing on policy documents, newspaper articles, and 27 semistructured interviews I probe the plausibility of these arguments in South Africa. I find that multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts pervade state institutions and that women living under customary law have limited political influence over these conflicts. An intersectional approach to substantive political rights may offer resources for addressing these problems.
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"The bridge I must be Is the bridge to my own power" Donna Kate Rushin, 1981 The Bridge Poem
Introduction
Since the 1980s liberal democracies have grappled with how to respond to multiculturalism, or the claim by minority groups to maintain their distinct way of life.
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Multiculturalism raises a contentious set of problems when minority group practices obstruct the liberal rights of women in the minority group. Legislation addressing these problems does not end the conflict but works within it. One legislative approach protects minority practices from women's rights. For example, the Hindu-dominated Indian state granted minority Muslims the right to adjudicate maintenance after divorce by retracting Muslim women's rights to long term maintenance under the civil code. A second legislative approach advances women's rights but can make common cause with racism and imperialism. Canada reinstated native status to women who married outside their group, but in doing so restricted the ability of all Native peoples to pass their status on to their children; that is likely to lead to their official extinction by the end of this century. A third legislative approach compromises on multiculturalism and women's rights. When post-apartheid South Africa recognized the marriages of blacks living under customary law it not only ended customary marriage practices that required women's legal minority, 1 Liberal democracies have contested elections, full suffrage, limited fraud, and effective guarantees of civil liberties (Collier and Levitsky 1997) it also recognized polygamy. 2 Each legislative approach works within a unitary perspective (Hancock 2007, 64) , meaning each treats multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts as a clash between two separate rights claims.
Why legislation sometimes resolves unitary rights conflicts in favor of multiculturalism, sometimes in favor of women's rights, and sometimes promotes compromise is an important question. This paper asks a prior question: what are the origins of these conflicts and how do they get reproduced? Asking this question brings into view the effects of these conflicts on minority women. Answering it provides insights on how multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts can be rejected, instead of negotiating them or passing legislation that is constrained by them. In the first half of the paper I draw on intersectionality theory to develop two arguments. The more liberal democracies commit to multiculturalism and women's rights the more they will identify these conflicts and institutionalize them in the state. As a result, state elites will decide the fate of minority women, entrenching their domination. The second half of the paper probes the plausibility of these two arguments in post-apartheid South Africa and finds that they are credible. I conclude by considering how an intersectional approach to substantive political rights might undermine these outcomes.
Theorists have worked extensively on multiculturalism, women's rights, and conflicts between them. Their work has had global impact because it has been disseminated through international rights documents, scholarly publications, and 2 I use the term "black" to refer to three apartheid racial categories: black, coloured, and 4 This body of work has contributed to our understanding of multiculturalism, the passage of rights legislation, and conflicts that pit majority or minority practices against women's rights. 5 However, it has neglected the origins and reproduction of these conflicts, and their effects on minority women.
Intersectionality theory offers a basis for theorizing these political dynamics. When liberal democracies endorse multiculturalism and women's rights they endorse a unitary perspective. These unitary rights address injustices perpetrated against minority groups and women, but do not sufficiently address the injustices perpetrated at their intersection.
As a result, conflicts over minority women's rights emerge and are treated as multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts. These conflicts need not persist.
Minority women can identify shared priorities that are distinct from unitary rights claims 3 Will Kymlicka's scholarship, activism on behalf of international recognition of indigenous rights, and recent United Nations recognition of these rights is perhaps the best known example, as well as work like Susan Okin's Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?(1998) that circulates among feminist lawyers and academics throughout the global South. 4 Advocates of multiculturalism include Kymlicka (1995; 6/1/12 11:29 PM and Taylor (1994) ; feminist defenders of women's rights include Nussbaum (2000) and Okin (1998) ; theorists seeking accommodation include 6/1/12 11:29 PM and Deveaux (2006) . Analysts of indigenous rights include Yashar (2005) and 6/1/12 11:29 PM; for women's rights see work by scholars like Htun (2003) and Waylen (2007) . For empirical research that focuses on tensions between advocates of culture and women's rights see Basu (2003) , Joireman (2007) , Moors (1996), and Tripp (2002 Empirical scholars interested in multiculturalism and women's rights investigate why rights legislation gets passed and the political competition at work in these conflicts.
Their work points to a number of factors that shape the adoption of unitary rights, including social movements, the openness and inclusiveness of the public sphere, institutional legacies that emphasize group difference, and transnational movements (e.g., Htun and Weldon 2010 , Sieder 2002 , Walsh 2011 , Warren and Jackson 2002 , Waylen 2007 , Yashar 2005 . Scholarship on multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts is dominated by feminists and highlights local support for women's rights (to refute charges of imperial feminism), the power of minority leaders over minority women, the ethnocentric impulse driving public debate over multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts, and the marginalization of minority women in these debates. Most identify the state as a perpetrator of injustice through its refusal to endorse or implement rights (e.g., They claim from the state the right to cultural differences, and within their communities they work to change the traditions which they consider to infringe their rights. Their struggle is not for the recognition of an essential culture, but for the right to reconstruct, confront, or reproduce that culture not on the terms established by the state, but on those set out by their own indigenous peoples with the framework of their own internal pluralisms (2002, (394) (395) .
Echoing feminists in liberation struggles across the globe, indigenous women in Mexico seized the political opportunity that the uprising opened to challenge colonization and patriarchy in their communities simultaneously. 6 This is not to suggest that minority women will all agree on one course of action or must pursue cultural recognition and women's rights simultaneously. 7 Women are not a preconstituted, unitary group (Mohanty 1988) , hence they do not have a common identity or "objectively given"
interests (Weldon 2011, 442) . The basis of their organizing and the priorities they identify will vary. However, because minority women occupy a social location that is distinct from minority men and majority women they can identify shared priorities that are not contained by a multiculturalism versus women's rights framework. Scholarship that highlights the dual domination of minority women, that finds political competition with state elites can be central in these conflicts, and that minority women can identify priorities by working outside this unitary framework, point toward an intersectional approach. 
Intersectionality

Intersectionality emerged out of the experiences of women of color in the United
States who argued that attacking racism or sexism was insufficient for redressing their complex forms of oppression. Feminist theorists of color like Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) and Patricia Hill Collins (1990) argue behavioral, institutional, and structural processes position individuals in social locations marked by multiple forms of oppression and power (e.g., wealthy black women). Intersectionality thus displaces unitary identity claims that privilege one form of oppression over others (King 1988) . I focus on minority women not because this is an identity group that has been misrecognized or because they are the group most in need of remediation, but because minority women are at the center of pressing unitary rights conflicts that ignore intersectionality.
The constructionist approach at the core of intersectionality shifts attention away from identity politics and toward social locations that are constituted by multiple, intersecting forms of oppression. Scholars of women and politics use the word gender to signal how individual behaviors, institutions, and structures (e.g., political and economic systems) map inequalities onto bodies (Beckwith 2005 , Htun 2005 ) legitimizing women's subordination to men. I adapt the term "peoplehood" from Rogers Smith (2003) aspirations that are central to black demands; rights may also perform an important function in combating the experience of being excluded and oppressed" (Crenshaw 1996, 110-111 They can embrace family, faith, and tradition or women's rights. As a result, they are accused of collaborating with retrograde patriarchs or imperial feminists. These conflicts not only shape the lived experiences of minority women, their activism, and political preferences (King 1988) ; they also shape liberal democratic politics.
When liberal democracies endorse unitary rights they commit to legal reform that engages the courts and the bureaucracy; many also establish institutions for disadvantaged groups. These institutions do not treat minority groups or women as diverse "coalitions" with multiple interests or conceptualize them as social locations. On the contrary, the legal process incentivizes state actors to define each group narrowly and essentialize them. That makes it difficult for state actors to address those situated at the intersection. If minority group women lack political influence over public policy, they become objects of contention in a conflict between minority group leaders and women's rights advocates. Intersectionality and its constructionist foundations thus suggest two hypotheses about the origins and reproduction of multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts (Figure 1, right) .
H1:
The more that liberal democracies commit to multiculturalism and women's rights, the more multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts will be institutionalized in the state.
H2:
The more multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts move into state institutions, the more minority women become targets of state policy. If they are also marginalized in liberal democratic politics, these conflicts deepen their domination.
As liberal democracies increasingly endorse unitary rights they unwittingly institutionalize multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts in the state. State elites will identify, define, and prioritize the issues to be adjudicated in multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts. The conflicts will spread across state institutions and expand to encompass a wide range of issues, from disagreements over the leadership of a gender ministry, to bureaucratic battles among agencies over institutional purview and funding, to constitutional court cases. Group essentialism will also intensify. Legislators will reify minority groups and women by invoking unitary rights in debate; justices and bureaucrats will reify them by defining who is a minority member or woman, and who is not.
Because state elites and rights advocates will be legally required to accept the legitimacy of unitary claims, state actors tasked with adjudicating these conflicts will need to explain how their decisions support both sets of rights. These processes will increase the salience of unitary rights, making it difficult to conceive of minority groups or women as coalitions or social locations, or to imagine intersectional claims like those made by the women of Chiapas.
H2 expects that when these conflicts are centered in liberal states, and minority women are marginalized in liberal politics, these conflicts perpetuate minority women's domination. As multiculturalism and women's rights conflicts move into the state three sets of actors are likely to influence public policy: state elites seeking to shore up their support or undermine their opponents, and professional advocates of multiculturalism and of women's rights pursuing similar goals. Minority women will rarely be among them because as intersectional citizens facing multiple forms of injustice they will have fewer skills, experience, and are less likely to be viewed as legitimate political actors (Petersen and Parisi 1998; Hawkesworth 2003 ). Yet as multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts become institutionalized in the state, minority women will become the targets of state policy. Hence the domination of minority women will deepen, regardless of the legislative approach that the state takes, because they will lack the political agency to shape those outcomes. In sum, the more liberal democracies commit to unitary rights the more multiculturalism and women's rights conflicts move into the state; and the more that minority women are marginalized in liberal democratic politics, the more these conflicts will entrench that domination.
To operationalize these hypotheses I define multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts as two unitary claims that cannot be fulfilled without constraining the other. I assess the first dependent variable, the degree to which these conflicts are To what degree do they prioritize the issues to be adjudicated?
• High levels of institutionalization mean all three branches of government and institutions tasked with advancing these two sets of rights will be involved in the conflict. High levels of essentialism mean these institutions will refer to minority groups and women as distinct, homogenous groups. State elites will also identify and define the conflict, determine the priority issues to be adjudicated, and explain the relationship between these two sets of rights.
• Moderate levels mean one or two branches of government and at least one of the institutions tasked with advancing these two sets of rights will be involved.
Moderate levels of essentialism mean these institutions will treat minority groups and women as distinct but internally diverse. State elites will participate in identifying and defining these conflicts, setting priorities, and debating the relationship between these two sets of rights.
• Low levels mean only those institutions dedicated to multiculturalism and women's rights will be involved, state elites will treat these groups as intersecting and internally diverse. Civil society will identify and define the conflict, prioritize the issues to be adjudicated, and minority women will be at the forefront of the debate.
To assess state support for unitary rights claims, the independent variable that is hypothesized to cause the above outcomes, I examine the country's formal commitments to multiculturalism and women's rights. High-level commitments require constitutional endorsement and constitutionally mandated institutions in the state dedicated to advancing both sets of rights. Moderate levels require legal endorsement and legally mandated institutions in the state dedicated to both. Low levels require legal endorsement.
The second dependent variable, minority women's political domination, refers to their ability to publicly express shared priorities and influence public policy.
• High levels of domination in liberal democratic politics means that minority women will rarely speak about their shared priorities in public and will have little to no influence on public policy.
• Moderate levels of domination mean that minority women will convey some of their shared priorities in public, and that occasionally some state actors will listen and indicate that they have been heard.
• Low levels of domination mean that minority women will be prominent public speakers conveying their shared priorities and demanding public policy change, like the women in Chiapas. Further, state elites will listen and respond by referring to those priorities in their decision-making.
The variable hypothesized to cause these outcomes is the institutionalization of multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts in the state, operationalized above. To probe the plausibility of these hypotheses I turn to South Africa. Although I sought information about customary marriage reform and its implementation, many informants insisted on discussing the relationship between minority rights and women's rights more broadly. I created a "contact summary" (Miles and Huberman 1994, 51) , coded this discussion, the topic that triggered it, whether the informant was a bureaucrat or civil society actor, and degree of understanding of intersectional oppression. In addition to research memos and interim case summaries, I
Research Design and Methods
South
also charted types of constructionist and intersectionality theory, and diagrammed the To maximize external validity and establish causality requires comparative analysis. This paper does not do this; instead it engages in theory building by drawing on intersectionality to develop two arguments about multiculturalism and women's rights conflicts and then probes their plausibility in post-apartheid South Africa.
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Unitary Rights Commitments in South Africa
During the transition negotiations (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) South Africans wrote a new constitution and adopted a series of unitary rights and institutions that demonstrate a high-level commitment to both multiculturalism and women's rights. In 1990, pervasive 13 "Plausibility probes are preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted" (George and Bennett 2004, 76) . Women's rights advocates determined to contest chiefly power and secure the primacy of legal equality for all South African women. They presented a series of submissions to the Technical Committees demanding that equality trump tradition.
Characterizing the chiefs' tactics as a bid for domination over poor, rural, black women Women's rights advocates carried the day: the Bill of Rights explicitly recognized gender equality but not customary law:
Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law (s 9 (1)) [and] the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth (s 9 (3)).
The equality clause in the South African Constitution (RSA 1996) thus promises all citizens legal equality and endorses affirmative action for members of disadvantaged groups.
Although the chiefs were on the defensive at the transition negotiations and lost ground during the writing of the final constitution, they won important concessions. The interim and final constitutions recognize cultural, religious, and and customary law. It granted chiefs the right to "continue to function…in accordance with the applicable laws and customs, subject to any amendments or repeals of such laws and customs" (RSA 1993, s 181(1)). Chiefly sovereignty was protected until municipal elections would be held in 2000, and both constitutions promise that "traditional leadership" and customary law will be "recognized,"
albeit subject to the constitution, and that the courts must apply customary law where applicable (Constitutional Principle XIII; Ch. 12). The final constitution's commitments to customary law were weaker: it used words like "may" instead of "shall," and dropped the language of protection. Although customary law is subject to the provisions of the constitution, which includes the equality clause, constitutional commitments to culture and the chiefs meant that wherever gender equality clashed with customary law the former could only be secured proactively, through legislation, bureaucratic decision-making, and court cases. 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
Did these high levels of support for both sets of rights generate and reproduce multiculturalism versus women's rights conflicts throughout the new democratic state?
To answer this question I turn to the RCMA and investigate: 1) the extent to which branches of government and institutions tasked with advancing these two sets of rights were involved in the conflict, 2) the extent to which they essentialized these two groups and 3) the extent to which state elites identified and defined this conflict, prioritized the issues to be adjudicated, and explained the relationship between these two sets of rights. I find high levels of state elite involvement that cuts across all branches of government and includes all constitutionally mandated institutions tasked with advancing these rights; high levels of essentialism; and state elites dominating the process throughout. I begin with a brief overview of the RCMA.
The RCMA explicitly fulfills the goals of multiculturalism by recognizing customary marriage. The Act also takes important steps to improve the rights of women living in customary marriages. It unequivocally ends women's legal discrimination by
Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMC). The former was dissolved with the establishment of a Ministry of Women, Children, Youth and the Disabled, and the latter was reformed as a parliamentary committee for this ministry.
stating both spouses have "equal status and capacity," and guarantees women the right to own and inherit property by declaring that all customary marriages subsequent to the promulgation of the act are in community of property (RCMA 1998, s 6 and s 7(2)).
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Women have the ability to acquire and dispose of property, enter into contracts, and litigate under their own power. Lobola (a form of bridewealth) is permitted but not legally binding. The RCMA discourages formal and informal polygamy by requiring the consent of all spouses, prioritizing the wishes of individual women over their families, and valuing women's wishes equally with those of men, but it does not outlaw them.
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Basic requirements of the Act ensured that its implementation would involve the other two branches of government. It requires the registration of customary marriage, a court application for additional spouses, a division of marital property at each subsequent marriage, and a court divorce to ensure a legal record of a couple's marital status (RCMA 1998, s 7 and 8) . The Act places these powers in the civil as opposed to customary courts.
As Victoria Bornstein notes, the RMCA leaves "the courts with the task of protecting the interests of women" (Bornstein 2000, 562) . To protect these interests, the Department of Home Affairs would first need to routinize customary marriage registration (which it did not do). 20 The RCMA thus drew the civil courts and Department of Home Affairs into the conflict.
18 Couples married before this date had to formally apply for a change in their marital status for this rule to apply to them. Analysts have argued this provision contravenes the equality clause in the constitution (Mameshela 2004; Zimmerman 2001) . 19 Approximately 7 percent of African women reported living in formally polygamous marriages just prior to the passage of the RCMA (Budlender, Chobokoane, Simelane 2004, 17) . Budlender et. al. warn statistics on South African marriage are generally unreliable, not least because the word for "woman" and "wife" in many South African languages is the same. Informal polygamy is common, as men married under customary marriage in rural areas migrate to urban areas for work and marry urban women under civil law while remaining married to their rural wives.
20
Confirmed by a number of informants, including Jennifer Williams of the Women's Legal Centre, Cape Town.
The passage of the Act did not, however, shift the conflict out of the legislature.
The RCMA does not mention the lack of magistrate courts in rural areas, does not mention funding, does not address the need for legal training of magistrates or lawyers, and does not discuss the need to educate those living in customary marriages about their new rights. The Portfolio Committee on Justice acknowledged these problems before the bill was passed. Although all of these problems have not been resolved, the legislature has added schedules as well as an amendment to the Act in 2009. Thus all three branches of government remain involved in addressing customary marriage.
Just as legislation extended this multiculturalism versus women's rights conflict to the courts and the bureaucracy, the process leading to its passage also drew these institutions into the conflict. Indeed, the impetus for the legislation began with the courts.
Immediately after the transition to democracy conservative justices determined to secure the interests of whites as cultural minorities upheld discriminatory customary laws denying women maintenance, property, and inheritance rights, and protected a husband's marital power over his wife. 21 The ANC dominated-government was faced with white justices upholding African customary law, echoing the apartheid era when whites political elites deliberately reified ethnic differences among blacks to justify the creation of separate homelands ruled by chiefs beholden to the NP. In response, the ANC claimed the mantle of multiculturalism. It charged the South African Law Commission (SALC) with establishing a committee to recommend public policy reform on customary law through a process of research and community consultation.
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21 Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo chaired the committee. For a discussion of several conservative court decisions during the 1990s see Fishbayn (1999) . 22 Advocates of women's rights had attempted to raise the issue of customary marriage earlier on the grounds that it violated women's rights, but to no avail (Albertyn et al 1999, 94-95) .
In 1996, before community consultation began, SALC's Project Committee on the
Harmonisation of the Common Law and Indigenous Law (HCLIL) published an Issue
Paper defining the problem and outlining priorities that became core elements in the RCMA. The Committee identified the conflict, defined it, determined the priority issues that the legislation would address and explained the relationship between multiculturalism and women's rights. Although the problem from the vantage point of the ANC was about political competition with the NP over the chiefs, it was politically advantageous for the Committee to define the problem as a multiculturalism versus women's rights conflict.
SALC argued that while aspects of customary marriage conflicted with international agreements and constitutional commitments to gender equality, it was important to be sensitive to the legacy of white rule that had maligned indigenous marriage practices. At the time of the democratic transition South Africa was the only country in the region that did not recognize customary marriage. Scholars and lawyers involved in the negotiations over customary marriage emphasized that their central purpose was to "restore dignity" to Africans whose marriages had been denied legal recognition since the colonial era. 23 Although the Issue Paper acknowledged that customary law did not accurately reflect current practices, was a product of colonial history, and had changed over time, SALC nonetheless justified the recognition of customary marriage on the basis of valued, long-standing practices, thus essentializing African culture (HCLIL 1996) . The Paper referred to women's rights in the constitution and described women living under customary law but did not disaggregate the latter by 23 Rashida Manjoo, "Developments in Women's Human Rights in South Africa," February 11, 2010, Charlottesville, Virginia. Cathi Albertyn, personal email communication.
type of marriage or otherwise (it did so for men) (HCLIL 1996) . This selective essentialism guided the Committee's priorities: customary marriage would be given full legal recognition, a ban on polygyny was deemed impractical, and lobola would be optional (HCLIL 1996) . Once these decisions were made the Committee consulted with civil society about whether customary law should be recognized within a single or dual legal system.
After this first round of community consultation the Committee published a Discussion Paper recommending the recognition of customary marriage, a dual legal system, the continuation of polygyny, and raised for debate whether lobola should be retained as a legal practice or social convention (Albertyn et al 1999, 101) . In short, the The South African Law Commission's review process included two opportunities for community consultation and in both rounds advocates of women's rights involved minority women; thus minority women were not totally excluded from the process.
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The ability of minority women to develop and convey their shared concerns to state institutions was nonetheless constrained as SALC had identified and defined the problem as well as the priority issues, women's rights advocates were working within that framework, and rural women's groups were in disarray. CALS was the only organization that consulted minority women's organizations and its efforts are praiseworthy. However, like many groups, the RWM collapsed after 24 Chiefs also participated in the SALC review. Their views were canvassed at workshops, a round table, and through responses to SALC discussion papers. Most supported the legal recognition of customary marriage but were "suspicious" of a number of proposed reforms, including their loss of adjudicatory power to magistrate courts. They argued women's rights were emblematic of alien Western values and opposed equality between spouses (Albertyn et al. 1999, 103) . 25 Likhpaha Mbatha, a member of CALS who attended a number of meetings with minority women, recalls that at one event a large group of women enthusiastically chanted their demands to end polygyny while a small group of women in polygynous marriages huddled in the background. constitution were insufficient for minority women, who lacked political influence over public policy. Absent substantive political rights, CALS worked with a small group of minority women to convey their priorities to SALC. Although the core elements of the draft Bill remained unchanged, and CALS reports that minority women were unhappy that the Committee endorsed a dual rather than single legal system, SALC did not ignore these women entirely. The draft Bill included two recommendations made by CALS: that customary marriages should be in community of property and that the courts shoulddivide the matrimonial estate whenever a man took an additional wife (104). Together, CALS and the RWM ensured that minority women's marginalization in the new democracy was not total.
Conclusion
To be completed.
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